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Industrial Policy and the Rights of
Labor: The Case of Foreign
Workers in the French Automobile
Assembly Industry
Mark J. Miller*
The foreign labor which made possible Western Europe's postwar economic
growth' has become a permanent, if belatedly recognized, component of the
region's labor markets. 2 Technological change and new industrial policies stress-
ing efficiency, skilled labor, and rationalization threaten foreign workers, raising
complex and important issues of law and social policy in the debate over labor's
role in industrial policy. These changes already have resulted in grave problems
which make agreement and clarification of the rights of foreign workers in
national and international law a matter of considerable urgency.
Since World War II, the rights of foreign workers in national and international
law have loomed as potentially explosive issues both within Western European
countries employing foreign workers and between host countries and the labor-
sending countries of the Mediterranean Basin.3 Western European industrial
policies promoting advanced technology, automation, and a highly educated
work force constitute a marked shift away from earlier industrial strategies de-
pendent upon massive foreign worker employment. The evolution of foreign
worker rights and legal protections may have contributed to this shift in industrial
policies. However, a combination of several other factors-technological ad-
vances, intense international competition, and a more general European unease
over postwar migration policies-probably best accounts for the adoption of
industrial policy goals which threaten to unemploy a disproportionally large
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware; U.S. Correspondent to the
Continuous Reporting System on Migration, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment; Assistant Editor, International Migration Review; B.A. 1972, University of Wisconsin; M.A.
1973, University of Wisconsin; Ph.D. 1978, University of Wisconsin.
1. See generally C. KINDLEBURGER, EUROPE'S POST WAR GROWTH (1967).
2. See, e.g., A. LE PORS, IMMIGRATION ET DEVELOPEMENT L'ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL (1976).
3. For example, of 4,223,900 resident aliens in France in 1981, there were 859,400 Portuguese,
816,900 Algerians, 452,000 Italians, 444,500 Moroccans, 412,500 Spaniards, 193,200 Tunisians,
118,100 Turks, and 67,800 Yugoslavs. See ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV., SYSTEME
D'OBSERVATION PERMANENTE DES MIGRATIONS 1982 (1983).
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number of foreign workers. 4 While the surge in foreign worker employment in
the service sector in France suggests that many foreign workers will adapt to the
industrial transformations of the 1980s, 5 many other foreign workers will not or'
cannot adapt to those changes.
Perhaps the case which best illustrates the significance of foreign labor's role in
postwar European industrial policy and the legal issues raised thereby is the
troubled French automobile assembly industry. Massive recruitment of foreign
labor facilitated its expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, 6 making the automobile
industry a keystone of and showcase for French industrial policy. However, since
the early 1970s, the industry has been repeatedly crippled by strikes largely
supported, and often autonomously organized, by foreign workers. This strike
wave has its roots in the May-June Events of 1968.7 Because of the economic and
Table 1
Total Employed and Foreigners Employed by Renault (1952-1978)
Year Total Employees Total Foreigners % Foreigners
1952 51,950 5,300 10.2
1963 63,603 6,700 10.5
1964 58,930 5,200 8.8
1965 62,902 5,600 8.9
1966 66,171 9,197 13.9
1967 66,882 9,765 14.6
1968 76,060 12,250 16.1
1969 (9/30) 83,000 17,488 21.0
1970 (9/30) 91,500 21,993 24.0
1971 94,000 21,474 22.8
1972 94,335 21,547 22.8
1973 96,970 21,817 22.5
1974 96,240 21,410 22.2
1975 100,875 21,517 21.3
1976 110,406 22,205 20.2
1977 110,855 21,685 19.6
1978 (4/30) 109,574 21,311 19.5
Source: Adapted from R6gie Renault Personnel Office Records
4. See El Bahi, Les immigresface auxr reconversions industrielles, 114 PRESSE ET IMMIGRES EN
FRANCE 5 (1984).
5. In France, the number of aliens employed in the tertiary sector increased by 21 percent between
1973 and 1979 whereas total employment in the sector over the same time period increased by 18.3
percent. See 8 TRAVAIL ET EMPLOi 54 (1981).
6. See Tables I and 2, infra p. 362-363.
7. The so-called May-June Events were precipitated by student protests and student-police clashes
in the Paris region. As student protests flared nationwide, a general strike was called, paralyzing the
French economy. The crisis threatened the French Government with collapse until the Grenelle
Accords between unions and employers ended the strike. The government eventually emerged vic-
torious in national elections brought on by the crisis.
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political importance of the automobile manufacturing industry in France, this
strike wave has not only had a major impact on the industry, but also upon French
politics generally.
Episodic outbreaks of violence involving striking foreign auto workers have
contributed to the growing electoral strength of the anti-immigrant National Front
led by Jean-Marie LePen. In two recent national elections, the National Front
garnered around ten percent of the vote. With the likely adoption of a new
electoral law, the National Front seems destined to win a sizeable bloc of seats in
the 1986 parliamentary elections.
Improvements in the legal rights of foreign workers and their growing con-
sciousness of those rights has spurred the automobile industry unrest. Since the
election in 1981 of Socialist President Franqois Mitterand and the formation of the
left-wing coalition government, foreign workers have felt more than ever before
that they can express their longstanding grievances and participate in unions and
other employee institutions without fear of losing their work and residency per-
mits (the major attributes of foreign worker legal inferiority). The violent auto-
mobile industry strikes that marked the early stages of the Mitterand era amount
to a revolt by foreign automobile workers against the role assigned to them by
postwar French industrial policy. 8 They no longer accept assembly line work that
leaves them with no possibilities for advancement.
The general restructuring of the automobile industry and the ancillary use of
Table 3.
Principal Autoworker Strike Movements in France 1982-83
Firm-Plant Date Duration Issues
CitroeZn-Aulnay
Citroen-Levallois
Citroen-Asnieres
Citroen-Les Epinettes
Renault-Flins
Talbot-Poissy
Citroen-Levallois
Renault-Flins
Talbot-Poissy
Citroen-Aulnay
Chausson-Gennevilliers
Citroen-Levallois
UNIC-FIAT
Citroen-Aulnay
Talbot-Poissy
Spring 1982
May 1982
May 1982
May 1982
Spring 1982
Spring/Summer
1982
Several Months
Several Weeks
Several Days
Several Days
Several Weeks
Several Months
Employee and Union Rights
New Professional Classifica-
tion System Protested
Employee and Union Rights
October 1982 Several Days Application of Auroux Laws
Winter 1983 Several Weeks Reform of Professional Clas-
sification System
Winter 1983 Several Weeks Union Representation/Job
Security
Winter 1983 Several Weeks Sanctions Against CGT
Strikers
Winter 1983 Several Days Salaries/Production Tempo
Winter 1983 Several Days Firing of CGT Delegate
Winter 1983 Several Weeks Reform of Professional Clas-
sification System
Spring 1983 Several Days Threatened Firings/Salaries
December 1983 Several Weeks Layoff Plan
8. See Table 3, infra p. 364.
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new technology such as industrial robots have led to less labor intensive produc-
tion processes. Not only are fewer employees used, but these new processes
require employees of greater skill and education. These trends have played an
increasingly important part in foreign worker unrest as thousands stand to lose
their jobs with bleak chances for reemployment. The plight of unemployed
foreign workers in particular raises troublesome questions about the legal obliga-
tions of host countries, both under their own law and under international law. One
might ask whether the most common solution in Europe to the problem of foreign
workers-cash incentive programs for foreign worker repatriation-violates for-
eign workers' rights and, further, whether it is a fair or even practical solution.
The purpose of this article is to explore how these issues arose historically in
the French automobile assembly industry and to suggest the inadequacy of pres-
ent attempts to resolve them. Part I recounts the early history of foreign workers
in the auto industry. Part II sketches the character and status of foreign labor in
the plants and Part III explains the growing militancy of such workers in recent
years. Part IV describes recent French Government efforts to resolve the prob-
lems posed by the role of foreign workers in a changing auto industry. Finally, the
conclusion criticizes the government's solution and suggests two principles that
should guide future efforts in this area.
I. THE CREATION OF AN ISSUE
At the peak of foreign worker employment in the French automobile assembly
industry in the early 1970s, nearly one out of four auto workers was a foreigner;9
and nearly one out of every four foreigners employed in France found work in
automobile manufacturing. 10 Since then, the number of foreigners employed by
the auto industry has steadily declined. While total employment in the industry
actually increased between 1973 and 1979, the number of foreign employees
declined by more than one-fifth."
Table 4
Total Salaried Employees and Foreign Salaried Employees in Auto Assembly
in 1973, 1976 and 1979*
Year Total Aliens % Aliens
1973 507,900 125,900 24.8
1976 527,100 104,000 19.7
1979 520,900 96,900 18.6
*Based on a Ministry of Labor survey of firms employing ten or more persons. Such firms employ
80.3% of total employees in the industrial and commercial sectors.
Source: Travail et Emploi, No. 8, April-June, 1981, p. 53.
9. See Table 4, infra p. 365.
10. Willard, Conditions d'emploi et salaires de la main d'oeuvre etrangere, 162 ECONOME ET
STATISTIQUE 15 (1984).
II. See Table 4, supra note 9.
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The effects of the recession upon the French auto assembly industry and its
consequent restructuring, have disproportionately affected foreign workers. Em-
ployers predict that an additional 40,000 jobs will be lost in automobile manufac-
turing between 1984 and 1986.12 In 1982, of the some 282,000 firings for
economic reasons in France, 34,000, or 12 percent of the total, involved foreign
workers, even though aliens comprise only nine percent of the total work force. 13
Out of the 1.8 million unemployed workers in France in 1982, over 220,000 were
foreigners. ' 4 In order to understand these statistics, one should note that France
has quite liberal naturalization laws, and that French statistics on aliens are
imprecise. An unknown number of foreign auto workers probably became
French nationals in the 1970s and therefore would no longer be counted as aliens.
Nevertheless, naturalization can be safely assumed to be a minor factor in the
decrease in the number of foreign auto workers since most foreign workers are
from nationality groups which naturalize at a low rate. 1
Even before World War II, foreign and colonial workers comprised important
segments of the work forces at several French auto plants. The Renault factory at
Billancourt, for example, had a significant Algerian work force between the
wars;' 6 in fact, Renault became a crucible for the early Algerian nationalist
movement. By 1952, ten percent of Renault's work force was foreign. 17 The
number of foreigners employed by Renault increased sharply only in the second
half of the 1960s, 1" which was a period of enormous French industrial
expansion. 19
The French Government established a National Immigration Office in 1945 to
regulate immigration. 20 Unlike most European countries, France was considered
to be open to immigration, and permanent immigration, especially from Italy and
the Iberian Peninsula, was encouraged. At the same time, however, over the 34
year period from 1948 to 1981, more than 60 percent of all immigrants from
countries subject to National Immigration Office regulation (which excludes
Algeria and many other African states) entered France outside established immi-
gration procedures and had to have their status legalized.21 Hence, France also
condoned technically illegal immigration. French immigration policy was further
complicated by an unofficial policy which distinguished between immigrant
12. See Le Monde, 18 janvier 1984, at 40.
13. See Benoit, Les immigres et la crise de l'emploi, Le Monde, I f6vrier 1984, at 30.
14. Id.
15. According to 1977 naturalization statistics for France, only 0.54 percent of Moroccans natu-
ralized as compared to 1.03 percent of Italians, 1.24 percent of Tunisians and 1.37 percent of
Spaniards. See generally POPULATION ET SOCIETES 98 (1977).
16. See G. CROSS, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL FRANCE (1983).
17. See Table 1, supra note 6.
18. Id.
19. See V.C. Marie, Dynamique de l'integration structurelle de la main d'oeuvre etrangere en
France 307 (1980) (unpublished Ministry of Labor paper); Lepas, La croissance et les grands
equilibres economiques, in PROFIL ECONOMIQUE DE LA FRANCE 35 (J.P. Page ed. 1981).
20. Ord. No. 45-2658, 1945 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.](Law on the
Conditions for Entry and Stay in France of Foreigners) and Ddcret No. 46-550, 1946 J.O. (On the
Regulation of the Public Administration of the Organization of the National Office of Immigration).
21. See Immigration Clandestinee, 106 MENSUEL DES STATISTIQUES DU TRAVAIL 8 (1983).
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groups regarded as capable of assimilation (Europeans) and those incapable of
assimilation (North Africans and eventually other Africans and Asians). 22 The
entry of non-European foreigners in particular was viewed primarily as a labor
market expedient, like the guestworker policies in Switzerland23 and the Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany). 
2 4
Likewise, during a period of rapid economic growth and social change in the
second half of the 1960s, French automobile manufacturers hired many foreign
workers because of the scarcity of French workers in certain areas and the
availability of foreign labor (whether legal or illegal). Figure I portrays the sharp
climb in foreign worker employment at one auto assembly company before the
abrupt decline starting in 1973.25
Further recruitment of foreign workers was prohibited by the government in
1974,26 although already legally present aliens could continue to be hired unless a
citizen or permanent resident alien also applied for the job. Under the so-called
priority to indigenous labor policy, an employer must hire an indigenous worker
if faced with the choice of hiring either a nonpermanent alien or a citizen (or
permanent resident alien). The impact of the 1974 recruitment ban has been
diluted by the continuing legalization of improperly documented aliens and the
legal arrival of second generation migrants and migrant spouses on the labor
market.
While the auto industry's massive recourse to foreign labor industry can be
explained by perceived shortages in the indigenous labor market, industry em-
ployers also found foreign labor more willing to accept physically difficult as-
sembly line work. Such work generally required minimal training and foreigners
often were seen as particularly well-suited for repetitious tasks. African workers
were seen as better than French workers for jobs in high heat environments, such
as auto industry press shops. Employers had to pay a fee to recruit foreign
workers and had to hire translators, but this was a small cost to pay for labor
peace and a disciplined work force. As Frenchmen increasingly shunned such
monotonous, tiresome work, employers came to regard foreign workers as an
indispensable component of their labor forces in the enormous factories clustered
around Paris. 27 The more foreigners were hired, the harder it became to hire and
retain French workers as auto assembly line work came to be regarded as de-
meaning for Frenchmen. It is important to stress that this situation prevailed
primarily in Paris-area factories where there was a huge reservoir of foreign labor.
Auto assembly factories outside of the Paris region generally employed far fewer
foreigners. 28
22. See G. TAPINOS, L'IMMIGRATION ETRANGERE EN FRANCE 18-19 (1975).
23. See Maillat, L'immigration en Suisse, in LES TRAVAILLEURS ETRANGERS EN EUROPE OCCI-
DENTALE 105 (P. Bernard ed. 1976).
24. Lohrmann, La Riglementation de r immigration etrangere en RFA et ses implications politi-
ques, in LES TRAVAILLEURS ETRANGERS EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE 357 (P. Bernard ed. 1976).
25. See Figure 1.
26. SECRETARIAT D'ETAT AUX TRAVAILLEURS IMMIGRES, LA NOUVELLE POLITIQUE DE L'IMMI-
GRATION 37 (undated).
27. See A. LE PORS, supra note 2, at 151-59.
28. See Table 2,supra note 6.
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Employers also valued foreign worker employment because it was seen as
attenuating certain labor relations problems in an industry that is the historic
barometer of such relations in France. Initially, under the French system of work
and residency permits, foreign workers were virtually tied to their employers, a
situation that many French employers, including the automobile industry, found
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very much to their liking. However, restrictions on alien employment and resi-
dency were later progressively eased with length of residency. 29
The inferior legal status of foreign workers seems to have influenced the
employment strategies of several French automakers. Due to their background
and contingent legal status, foreign workers in France were seen as less likely to
join leftist-dominated trade unions and less likely to make demands on employ-
ers. Citroen in particular relied on foreign worker recruitment as the keystone of
its labor relations strategy which aimed at building a house union to the detriment
of more representative national unions. 3 0 The company received special National
Immigration Office cooperation in recruiting Moroccan workers selected for their
physical abilities and primitive rural backgrounds."3 Citroen's Moroccan connec-
tion accounts for the fact that nearly one-fourth of all Moroccans employed in
France today work in the auto assembly industry. 32 The firm also favored rotation
of its work force. Hence, a steady supply of Moroccan workers was available to
Renault and other companies near Paris. Unlike Citroen, Renault hired most of its
foreign employees on the spot.
In light of the important role that foreign workers came to play in the auto-
mobile assembly industry and other important industries, an implicit link be-
tween the legal status of foreign workers and industrial policy seemed to develop.
Decisions to build huge assembly plants were made on the assumption that a
virtually inexhaustible supply of foreign workers could be tapped.33 This devel-
opment gave rise to a paradox: The very industry that symbolized a transformed,
modernized industrial France employed large numbers of workers whose legal
status, in several key respects, harkened back to labor's in the 19th century prior
to the development of the modern labor movement. Many critics of French
immigration policy termed the inferior legal and sociopolitical status of foreign
labor a new form of slavery. 34
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN WORKER EMPLOYMENT IN AUTO
ASSEMBLY
Foreigners disproportionally occupy the lower echelons of industry job ladders
which French workers generally regard as unattractive due to the level of physical
effort involved and the unhealthy or dangerous working conditions. 3 Indeed,
29. Ord. No. 45-2658, 1945 J.O. (On the Conditions for Entry and Stay in France of Foreigners),
as amended by Ddcret No. 76-383, 1976 J.O. (On the Conditions for Entry and Stay of Family
Members of Foreigners Authorized To Stay in France).
30. L. GANI, SYNDICATS ET TRAVAILLEURS IMMIGRES 138-41 (1972).
31. See Confdderation Frangaise Ddmocratique du Travail, in LE LIVRE NOIR DU TRUST CITRO9N
(1966).
32. Resultats de l'enquete d'octobre 1979 sur la main d'oeuvre etrangere, 94 STATISTIQUES DU
TRAVAIL 52 (1982).
33. Unpublished interviews with French automobile industry officials (1980 and 1983).
34. See, e.g., J. BENOIT, E. COMME ESCLAVE (1980).
35. See Rerat, Petit & Bauman, Les emplois tenus par la main d'oeuvre etrangere, in TRois
APPROCHES DES PROBLEMES D'EMPLOI 13 (F Rerat ed. 1974).
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many foreign auto workers are illiterate. At the Aulnay-sous-bois Citroen factory,
for example, 66 percent of all manual workers, about three quarters of whom are
foreigners, were classified as illiterates as late as 1984.36 The fact that many
foreign workers are not literate in French and that most have not completed
primary education creates an enormous barrier to their professional advancement.
In particular, such workers find themselves unable to take the written exams often
required for professional advancement. Despite the availability of worker educa-
tion programs, few foreign workers complete them. At the Talbot factory in
Poissy, only 213 workers out of a 9,000-man work force completed literacy
courses in 1980. This number declined to 46 in 1981.
3
1
Any explanation for the low qualifications or low certified skill levels of most
foreign auto workers must return to the recruitment process. Citroen, and to a
lesser extent other French automobile manufacturers, deliberately sought out
physically able but poorly educated foreigners to fill manual labor positions.
38
Foreign workers often possess skills not reflected in their professional rankings
because they cannot or do not obtain certificates based on examinations and
successful completion of courses. A perceived gap between actual foreign worker
skill levels and their formal classification as unskilled or lowly skilled workers
has been a major source of unrest. Foreign workers frequently charge that the
industry's system of remuneration based on a worker's formal qualifications and
job description discriminates against them. 39 This issue has strained relations
between non-French workers and French workers and unions.
During the period of massive foreign worker recruitment, there was little direct
competition between foreigners and Frenchmen for jobs. French workers took
the best jobs, leaving jobs requiring f~w or no qualifications to foreigners.
Consequently, an important degree of ethnic stratification developed: Foreigners
employed by French automobile manufacturers are concentrated in so-called
"dirty" jobs, whereas Frenchmen predominate in highly skilled positions. In
Paris-area auto factories, foreign workers comprise over half of all assembly line
workers. Table 5 demonstrates the concentration of foreigners in assembly line
work at the Renault factory at Billancourt. So-called nonprofessional workers
comprise the bulk of assembly line workers and over half of the unskilled work-
ers are of North African background. Overall, nearly half of all foreigners em-
ployed in auto assembly hail from North Africa. Table 6 further portrays a pattern
of foreign workers clustered in the least desirable jobs while Frenchmen pre-
dominate in more attractive posts. Table 7, which breaks down the category of
manual laborers (ouvriers specialises) by French and non-French background at
three Renault factories over the period 1969 to 1977, suggests that the percentage
of foreign workers among manual workers steadily increased with time, even
after the recruitment halt. The major effect of the recruitment halt was to stabilize
the numbers of foreign workers.
Prior to 1974, a high rate of turnover characterized foreign worker employment
36. See Croissandeau, La formation alternative au ch6mage?, LE MONDE DE L'EDUCATION,
f~vrier 1984, at 8-9.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 31 and text accompanying notes 27-32.
39. Beaufils, L'Automobile otage de ses immigres, 206 L'ExPANSION 48 (1982-83).
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Table 6
Proportion of Foreigners in Various Types of Work at a French Auto Plant (%)
"Bad Jobs" Foreigners
Foundry 54
Presses, Painting 56
Assembly 48
Welder 46
Refinishing 43
Machine Operator 31
Metal Worker 30
Mechanic, Ajustor, Electrician 10
Sewing 6
Clerk 3
Source: Adapted from Dossier du Centre d'etudes et de recherches sur ]a qualification, L'Evolution
des Emplois et de la Main-d'Oeuvre dans l'industrie Automobile, p. 150. Dossier No. 15.
in the auto assembly industry. 40 These high turnover rates could be attributed to
several causes: deliberate company policies, the nature of the factory work, and
the transnational character of the labor force. In some factories, especially at
Citroen, contracts were not renewed so as to ensure a high turnover rate. The high
turnover rate was also a reflection of the physically taxing and monotonous nature
of foreign workers' jobs and their poor chances for professional advancement. A
third reason for high turnover rates stems from the transnational nature of foreign
labor. Foreign workers often would return home after relatively short employ-
ment terms to spend time with their families. Many foreign workers would quit
their jobs in order to take long vacations and then seek to be rehired in the auto
assembly industry upon their return. This pattern was profoundly altered by the
1974 recruitment ban.
41
After 1974, foreign auto workers without permanent resident alien status who
quit their jobs and returned home could no longer legally return to France to seek
reemployment. In addition, the recession made it less likely that foreign auto
workers would find other jobs. Hence, by 1975 the foreign worker turnover rate at
Renault had declined sharply. 42 By the 1980s, most foreign auto workers had
been employed for at least five years by their company. At the Talbot Poissy plant
in 1982, for example, only one of the 4,400 Moroccan manual workers had
worked there less than five years. 43 Some 3,200 of the Moroccans had worked
there for ten years or more. 44
The recruitment halt accentuated a process already under way: Foreign workers
had become immigrant workers with an important stake in the automobile assem-
40. Unpublished interviews with French government and industry officials including Mr. Andrd
Lebon, Ministry of Labor (1980 and 1983).
41. See supra note 26.
42. See Table 8, infra p. 374.
43. See Croissandeau, supra note 36.
44. Id.
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bly industry. The high turnover rate had contributed to low rates of foreign
worker unionization and the concentration of foreign employees in entry level
positions. In contrast, stabilization of the foreign work force in automobile
manufacturing gave rise to mounting unionization and sociopolitical co-
hesiveness, growing dissatisfaction with assembly line work, and resentment of
perceived discrimination against foreigners in terms of career opportunities in an
aging work force.
45
Although their legal status hinges upon the renewal of work and residency
permits, foreign workers have long enjoyed most of the formal rights accorded
French workers, including the right to join unions and to participate in employee
elections. Several restrictions against foreigners becoming union leaders and
employee representatives were struck down in the 1970s. 46 Foreign auto worker
unionization progressed steadily in the 1970s, whereas total union membership
stagnated before declining sharply in the 1980s. 47 In the auto plants around Paris,
the foreign worker unionization rate matched or exceeded that of French workers
by 1980.48 Although aliens were still under-represented, many foreign workers
had been elected to factory councils and to union leadership positions. There
were, however, sharp differences in the nature and progress of foreign worker
unionization from plant to plant.
At Paris-area Renault plants, traditional bastions of left-wing unions in a land
with a comparatively weak union movement, foreign workers generally sup-
ported left-wing unions. 49 Foreign worker support can swing sharply from one of
these unions to another depending on the aliens' views of a union's specific
program on issues of concern to them. The Communist-led Confidration Ggngr-
ale du Travail (CGT) proved to be more popular among North Africans, while its
chief left-wing rival, the Confidration Frangaise Democratique du Travail
(CFDT), generally was more attractive to foreign workers from the Iberian Penin-
sula. The tendency of Algerian workers to support the CGT arose in part from
agreements between the CGT and its Algerian counterpart, the Union Gndnrale
des Travailleurs Algiriens (UGTA). The CFDT has similar ties with union struc-
tures in the workers' home countries.
In some factories, such as Citrodn's Aulnay-sous-bois plant and Talbot's Poissy
plant, various types of management pressure (including alleged violations of
labor laws) resulted in foreign worker enrollment in so-called house unions
affiliated with the right-wing Conf6dration des Syndicats Libres (CSL). 50 For-
eigners risked losing work and residency permits or company housing and the
opportunity to participate in CSL-controlled vacation programs if they did not
support the house union. It was alleged that factory elections were fraudulent.
Foreign workers who openly sympathized with left-wing unions ran the risk of
45. Benoit, supra note 13.
46. For example, Loi No. 75-630, 1975 J.O. (Reinforcing the Rights of Foreign Workers) made
foreigners eligible for election as employee representatives with certain age, seniority and language
restrictions. See generally C. DE WENDEN, LES IMMIGRES DANS LA CITE (1978).
47. Unpublished conversations with trade union sources (June 1980 and July 1983).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. F BENOIT, CITROEN: LE PRINTEMPS DE LA DIGNITE 35-53 (1982).
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being assaulted and reported to homeland governmental services charged with
surveillance and maintenance of foreign worker political loyalty. Moroccan sym-
pathizers of the CFDT or CGT, in particular, could be jailed when they returned
home on vacation."' Thus, in several important plants, the inferior legal status of
foreign labor contributed to the development of labor relations dominated by
management interests. This led to an accumulation of grievances by foreign
workers and bitter antagonism between CSL supporters-most of whom were
skilled French workers-and foreign assembly line workers who supported the
CGT. 52 The volatility of foreign worker ties to French unions also stemmed in
part from the parallel development of cohesive and largely autonomous shop
floor organization among foreign workers53 based in many cases, upon national
or religious solidarity and the stratification in the workplace that fostered a sense
of collective identity. By the 1980s, Islamic fundamentalist solidarity groups,
whose loci of contact were Muslim prayer rooms provided by management
within the factories, had become an important force. In other instances, under-
ground revolutionary groups created foreign worker cohesion which could either
facilitate or obstruct foreign worker integration into union structures.
The frustration of foreign workers is reflected in rising absenteeism and gener-
ally less disciplined work habits. Whereas employers once prized foreign work-
ers for their industry and discipline, they now complain about the effects that
their inability to manage foreign labor effectively has on productivity and quality
control.14 Employer misgivings over massive hiring of foreign labor were
crystallized by a strike wave, brought on primarily by nonnational workers,
which plagued the industry in the 1970s before rocking its very foundations in the
1980s.
III. FOREIGN WORKERS AND THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY STRIKES
The May-June Events of 1968-the confrontations, strikes, and occupa-
tionsSS-were eclipsed over the short run by the conservative reaction.
Symbolically, however, May 1968 set an agenda for broad socioeconomic and
political change. Among the many issues placed on the French national agenda
by the May-June Events, although by no means the most prominent, were those
concerning foreign workers' rights, the integration of foreign workers into French
society.
Most major auto plants, and particularly those in the Paris area, were struck
and often occupied by their employees at the height of the 1968 crisis. Many
foreign employees supported these strikes and factory occupations despite the
possibility of deportation for disturbing public order. 56 In the wake of the crisis,
51. See M. MILLER, FOREIGN WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE 38-39 (1981); see generally
EWALD, L'ECOLE DES ESCLAVES (1983).
52. Benoit, supra note 13.
53. Id.
54. See Willard, supra note 10.
55. Benoit, supra note 13.
56. See A. VIEUQUET, FRANCAIS ET IMMIGRES 138-39 (1975).
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foreign auto workers became a major focus of organizational efforts by extreme
leftists who felt that major unions, such as the CGT, and even the French
Communist Party had revealed their non-revolutionary character and betrayed
working class interests by supporting the Grenelle Accords which won signifi-
cant wage and social concessions from employers in return for labor peace.
Extreme leftist efforts to organize foreign auto workers more often failed than
succeeded.57 But even when extreme leftist strikes were crushed, they often were
of longterm significance. They showed that foreign auto workers were capable of
labor militancy. Extreme leftists also succeeded in exposing the weaknesses of
trade union ties to foreign labor. As the major trade unions responded by seeking
to better integrate foreign auto workers and their interests, foreign workers be-
came less docile.
In 1973, a so-called greve bouchon (bottleneck strike) stopped production at
the sprawling Renault-Billancourt factory. A shop of some 400 workers, most of
whom were aliens, demanded a wage increase and upgrading of their profes-
sional status.58 The nearly week-long disturbance attracted national attention
because of the historic factory's importance as the bellwether of working class
trends and because of the large number of workers laid off by the work stoppage.
The strike also had anti-CGT overtones in a traditional bastion of support for the
CGT. After Renault largely met the strikers' demands, it was clear that the
inability of management or the unions to control foreign workers could wreak
havoc in an industry dependent upon assembly lines vulnerable to stoppage by
determined groups of employees.
Foreign worker protest movements in the early to mid 1970s were most signifi-
cant in the social sphere. In 1975, a strike movement in foreign worker housing
units, including housing for foreign auto workers in the Paris area, attracted
widespread support. The success of this group, the so-called SONACOTRA
strikers, may have some connection with the foreign auto worker strikes of the
summer of 1978 which struck Renault particularly hard. Again, shops of foreign
workers demanded wage increases and improvement of their professional ratings.
They wanted employers to treat them with dignity and they wanted careers, not
dead-end jobs. 5 9
By 1978 foreign auto worker unrest was evident throughout the industry.
However, it took the dramatic left-wing coalition electoral victories of 1981 to
embolden foreign workers at Talbot and Citroen to strike. Thirteen years after the
May-June Events, the victory of the left-wing coalition held out the promise of
the realization of the agenda of those strikes. 6° In any event, the change of
government meant that labor laws would be applied to Talbot and Citroen facto-
ries and that foreign workers would no longer have to fear sanctions if they
expressed themselves freely. 61 The announced intention of the new government to
57. See generally R. LINHART, THE ASSEMBLY LINE (1981).
58. Mehideb, Renault-Billancourt: le Tiers Monde d l'usine, CROISSANCE DES JEUNES NATIONS,
juin 1973, at 19-26.
59. Le Monde, 10 juin 1978, at 28.
60. See supra note 7. ,
61. Specifically, the new lois Auroux were to be applied which significantly strengthened workers'
rights. See 102 LE MONDE DOSSIERS ET DOCUMENTS 12 (1983).
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strengthen the rights of labor buoyed support for anti-CSL forces in elections at
the two companies. The CGT in particular scored impressive gains in elections
which were marred by violent confrontations between CGT supporters and CSL
supporters. 62 Since these employee elections, violence has periodically erupted
at the two plants. CGT- or CFDT-affiliated foreign workers repeatedly have
struck the two firms over a variety of issues. Each strike action has seriously
disrupted production, with strikers often damaging cars and production
equipment.
The strike movements at Talbot-Poissy and Citroen-Aulnay sparked foreign
worker-dominated strikes at other French auto plants. Paris-area Renault plants
were repeatedly hit by strikes as were several other manufacturers. In virtually all
cases, foreign workers comprised the vast majority of strikers. They generally
demanded upgrading of their pay and professional status along with the creation
of career opportunities. 63 Many of the strikes were groves bouchons, where one
or several shops of foreign workers would shut down production and thereby
force layoffs of'nonstriking workers. This situation led to confrontations between
strikers and nonstrikers, but the violence witnessed at Talbot and Citroen plants
was avoided.
Foreign worker strike movements in recent years often began autonomously at
the shop level without trade union backing, although either the CGT or CFDT
usually would seek to represent the strikers. The inability of the established
unions to control foreign workers hurt organized labor's credibility within the
industry and in French society at large. French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy
suggested that foreign auto worker strikes were expressions of Islamic fundamen-
talism and were being fomented by Iran. 64 Although there appeared to be little
evidence to support this charge, his allegation suggests the degree of governmen-
tal dismay over the recurrent strikes and over the inability of management and the
unions to end them.
The violence of the auto worker strikes, the severe production losses they
entailed and the breakdown of management, and even union control in the face of
a virtual rebellion by foreign auto workers had major repercussions upon French
politics. The strikes marred a period of national labor tranquillity which resulted
from labor support for the left-wing coalition government. As the government's
economic policies faltered, leading to a sense of impending economic crisis,
foreign auto worker unrest hurt the performance of a key economic sector 65 and
seemed to undermine the government's effort to restore confidence in its handling
of the economy. The strikes almost certainly contributed to a political backlash
against governmental immigration policies which has eroded support for left-
wing coalition parties in recent elections. 66
The auto worker strikes hastened plans to restructure and modernize the
French auto manufacturing industry. The two major automobile firms, Renault
62. See supra note 51.
63. Le Monde, 29 janvier 1983, at 35.
64. Benoit, supra note 13, at 41.
65. See Tuilly, French Automakers Lonely Slump, FORTUNE, Nov. 28, 1983, at 121; Automobile: La
France d la traine, LE PoINT, 2 janvier 1984, at 54.
66. Jarreau, Cher Mustapha, Le Monde, 13-14 mars 1983, at 1.
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and Peugeot (Peugeot acquired Citroen and Chrysler-Europe in the late 1970s),
announced plans to automate car production through the use of industrial
robots. 67 In the summer of 1983, Peugeot announced that it planned to fire 8,000
workers, including almost 3,000 workers at its Talbot plant. 68 Under French law,
the government must approve layoffs. 69 In December, an agreement between the
government and Peugeot was announced that authorized the firing of 1,905 work-
ers at Talbot, most of whom were foreigners. 7 0 This announcement sparked a new
strike and factory occupation, which again was accompanied by a great deal of
violence. Over fifty workers were injured before the CFDT and the CGT asked
the government to send in police forces to restore order, a virtually unprece-
dented act which bears mute testimony to the near total breakdown of labor
relations at the Talbot plant.
In 1985, a management shake-up at financially-troubled Renault increased
prospects for massive employee layoffs. Tens of thousands of assembly-line jobs
seemed threatened by the management change. Since the decision by the French
Communist Party to quit the government, a likely government-CGT showdown
over Renault raises the possibility of an auto industry strike escalating into
generalized labor unrest.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSES AND THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
Faced with the specter of unemployment due to industry plans to automate
many jobs, foreign auto workers are likely to continue to strike. However, the
outcome of the Talbot strike of December 1983-January 1984 suggests the limits
of the foreign auto workers' ability to stop layoffs. As French police evacuated
the Talbot strikers, a number of the strikers declared that they were willing to
return home if the government would give them a lump sum payment of some
200,000 francs.71
This unexpected turn of events has revived controversies over the rights of
unemployed foreign workers and the obligations of host societies and their home-
lands toward them. The legal questions surrounding cash payment for definitive
repatriation programs are particularly complex. Until 1981, non-permanent aliens
could be deported if they became public charges,72 but very few unemployed
foreigners were denied permit renewal on the grounds that they had become
public charges. Instead, French authorities favored giving foreign workers and
67. Liberation, 9 septembre 1983, at 30.
68. Noblecourt, Les lefons du conflit Talbot, Le Monde, 3 janvier 1983, at 14.
69. Loi No. 75-5, art. L.321-7, 1975 CODE DU TRAVAIL (FRANCE).
70. Thepaut, L'Affaire Talbot, 113 PRESSE Er IMMIGRES EN FRANCE 7 (1983).
71. See Delavennat, Souvent indesirables chez eux, L'ExPRESS, 13 janvier 1984, at 31.
Fr 200,000 amounted to approximately $25,000 at this time.
72. Loi No. 80-9, 1980 J.O. (Law On The Prevention of Clandestine Immigration-The Loi
Bonnet), as modified by Loi No. 81-82, 1981 J.O. (Law Reinforcing Security and Protecting Liberty)
empowered authorities to expel aliens lacking residency permits, the granting or renewal of which was
tied to an alien having employment. Hence, an unemployed alien could lose his residency authoriza-
tion and thereby be subject to deportation. This aspect of French law regarding foreigners was
modified by Loi. No. 81-973, 1981 J.O. (Law On the Conditions of Entry and Stay of Foreigners in
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their dependents a cash payment to go home in return for a promise never to
return to seek work and to renounce all rights to French social security. Unem-
ployed foreigners, if qualified, were entitled to full unemployment benefits and
eventually to welfare payments. However, work and residency permits for long-
term unemployed foreigners were not necessarily renewed unless there were
compelling humanitarian reasons for permit renewal.
Between 1977 and the change of government in mid-1981, the French Govern-
ment offered any foreign worker who agreed to go home, not just the unem-
ployed, a payment of 10,000 francs along with a smaller allocation for
dependents. 73 Over the five year period, only some 58,000 foreign workers,
along with 34,000 dependents, accepted the offer. 74 Left-wing parties and unions
sharply attacked the cash payment for repatriation program, calling it illegal and
unjust. In fact, the highest French administrative court, the Conseil d'Etat, had
ruled the program illegal because it exceeded the recognized powers of the
Ministry of Labor. 7 The government chose to ignore this ruling and continued to
administer the program.
For all the furor raised by the program, it had disappointingly meager results
for the conservative government. Over two-thirds of the foreigners who agreed to
go home under the program came from the Iberian Peninsula while less than four
percent of the returnees were Algerians. 76 Thus, the program was not attracting
foreign workers considered to be unassimilable, 77 whose presence was seen as
the cause of the societal malaise which the program was supposed to alleviate.
The program also was regarded as costly and it was feared that some participants
had returned to France despite their pledges.
The new left-wing government suspended the program shortly after assuming
power on the ground that it was unfair to entice foreign workers to forfeit their
rights to French social security. 78 Although the program was voluntary, critics felt
that participants were renouncing hard-earned rights and entitlements for a pit-
tance. The program also was seen as contradicting the spirit of official French
integration policy. Hence, after the new government assumed power, it seemed as
if a cash for repatriation policy would no longer be considered.
However, the new government did continue to honor the terms of a 1980
Franco-Algerian accord which provided for cash payments to repatriating Al-
gerian nationals. 79 By the time this accord expired at the end of 1983, only several
thousand Algerians out of a population of over 800,000 had agreed to repatriate
under its terms, although the offer was much more attractive than the 10,000
franc payment offered in the suspended program. 8 0 Under the Franco-Algerian
accord, returning workers could receive vocational training, resettlement aid, and
73. Benoit, supra note 13.
74. Id.
75. Unpublished interview with Andrd Lebon, Ministry of Labor (January 1980).
76. Benoit, supra note 13.
77. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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reimbursement for travel costs in addition to a minimum lump sum payment of
14,220 francs. The actual cash payment could be much higher depending on the
worker's monthly salary.8
The prospect of massive foreign worker layoffs in the auto assembly industry,
mounting racial tensions, and the political backlash against the Mitterand govern-
ment's immigration policies resulted in a policy reversal which has reopened the
debate over the legality of cash for repatriation payments and the obligations of
states toward unemployed workers. Since the Talbot evacuation in January 1984,
the French Government has indicated that it is drawing up plans to aid foreign
workers adversely affected by industrial restructuring. 82 Foreigners who lose
their jobs will be able to benefit from repatriation assistance and job training
geared to reintegration into the homeland economy of the worker. Thus, France
appears to have rejoined the FRG, Belgium, and the Netherlands with a cash for
repatriation policy. 83
V. CONCLUSION
Two principles should guide the formulation of public policies in this area of
concern. First, foreign worker repatriation should be voluntary. By authorizing
foreigners to work in jobs with a permanent character, states must recognize the
rights of alien workers and the stake they acquire in host societies. Second, in the
absence of specific guidelines covering the repatriation of foreign workers, for-
eign worker repatriation should be regulated by bilateral accords between foreign
worker host governments and the countries of origin.
For the most part, Western European states have honored the principle of
voluntary repatriation, although there have been isolated cases of abusive depor-
tations of established foreign workers and their dependents. With the exception
of the Franco-Algerian case, however, bilateral agreements regulating interna-
tional labor flows do not address the question of foreign worker repatriation in
detail, if at all. Hence, policies based on cash-for-foreign-worker-repatriation
develop unilaterally with little input from foreign worker homelands. The pros-
pect of large-scale foreign worker unemployment due to industrial restructuring
underscores the need for bilateral consultation and agreement between foreign
worker sending and receiving countries. It is encouraging to note that the French
Government plans to consult with labor-sending countries over the specifics of its
return policies.
Nonetheless, the fairness and practicality of cash payment for foreign worker
repatriation plans are questionable. First, past experience suggests that relatively
few foreign workers will choose to return home because of a cash incentive. 4
Most will not want to give up their rights in the French welfare state. Second,
economic and sociopolitical conditions in most foreign worker homelands do not
favor successful reintegration. Indeed, there is some question whether the home-
lands would welcome the return of thousands of their unemployed citizens when
81. id.
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there already are too few jobs to go around. It is unlikely, for example, that the
conservative monarchy in Morocco would welcome the return of thousands of
unemployed auto workers, many of whom have joined a Communist-dominated
union. Analysis of the international situation suggests that little progress will be
made toward bilateral agreement on return policy.
Foreign workers' lack of education makes it unlikely that they will successfully
complete job training programs. However, by extending job priority status-
which accords priority in hiring to unemployed auto workers-France can real-
istically hope to attenuate some of the human costs of its new industrial policy. 85
Cash for repatriation schemes offer only the illusion of a solution as repatriation
will probably be the choice of relatively few foreign auto workers. Moreover,
such plans undercut the rights of foreign workers by encouraging public expecta-
tions of massive repatriation that only hinder the struggle for integration of
foreign workers into French society.
